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REGULATION AND COMPETITION
POLICY: TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL

INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATION IN
THE BRAZILIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRV
Gesner Oliveira*
Caio Mdrio da Silva PereiraNeto''
ABSTRACT
This Article is divided into two parts. The first part
outlines the conceptual basis for possible institutional models
of interaction between competition and regulatory authorities, focusing on the question of complementary jurisdictions.
The second part describes the institutional configuration
implemented in the Brazilian telecommunications industry in
accordance with the General Telecommunications Act.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

As in several other emerging economies, the constitution of
a new regulatory framework represents one of the key issues of
the state reform agenda in Brazil. In particular, the interaction
between competition and regulatory agencies within a system
of complementary jurisdictions has become an essential element of the modernization process.
The implementation of such a system is an extremely
complex task. Two challenges merit special attention: (i) institutional inertia and rigidity; and (ii) the cost of coordinating
the various government departments and agencies involved.

t This Article is the result of research funded by the Getfilio Vargas Foundation, Research and Publications Center.
* Gesner Oliveira is President of Conselho Administrativo de Defesa
Econ6mica (CADE) (Brazilian Competition Agency); Ph.D in Economics, University
of California, Berkeley; Professor of Economics, at Getfilio Vargas Foundation.
** Attorney, graduate student, MA in Economic and Financial Law, University of Sao Paulo Law School; Research Assistant, Getdlio Vargas Foundation, Research and Publications Center.
1. Decreto No. 9472, de 16 de julho de 1997, LEX de 8.01.1997 [hereinafter
General Telecommunications Act].
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The purpose of this Article is to suggest criteria for choosing among different institutional configurations, taking into
consideration the importance of bureaucratic transaction costs
and possible economies of specialization between competition
and regulation.
The study comprises two parts. The first part discusses the
conceptual basis for a system of complementary jurisdictions
between the competition authority and regulatory agencies,
and highlights the possible advantages of such a system as
compared to alternative institutional configurations.
The second part illustrates the point by analyzing the
institutional model based on complementary jurisdictions implemented in the Brazilian telecommunications industry following privatization of the state-owned telecommunications
operators in 1998. This analysis highlights the relationship
between the competition authority in Brazil-Conselho
Administrativo de Defesa da Econ6mica (CADE)-and the
National Telecommunications Agency2 (ANATEL) in view of
the new legal framework governing the industry.3 The final
section presents key conclusions.
II. DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE COMPETITION
AUTHORITY AND REGULATORS: POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL
CONFIGURATIONS

Following the privatization of infrastructure sectors and
the creation of new regulatory agencies in Brazil, questions
have been raised as to how regulation should be coordinated
with the enforcement of competition law. These questions are
equally important at the local and state levels where independent regulatory activity has also gained importance.
Section II addresses this issue. Subsection A recalls that
regulation and competition policy were originally discrete activities. Subsection B notes the changes that have occurred in
the recent past, whereby the boundaries between competition
and regulation have become blurred. Lastly, Subsection C
discusses various institutional alternatives.

2. ANATEL is the new regulatory agency for the telecomunications industry.
3. See General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1.
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Competition Policy Versus Regulation: Boundaries in The
19th and 20th Centuries

The historical development of antitrust legislation and
regulation since the late 19th century suggests a delimitation
of boundaries between the two areas that seems self-evident at
first glance. Competition policy was conceived as aiming to
guarantee the proper functioning of market mechanisms; in
contrast, traditional regulation was designed to replace such
mechanisms in the event of inevitable market failures. A recent OECD paper compares antitrust and regulatory authorities from the standpoint of jurisdictional limitations.4 Chart 1
calls attention to four key differentiating elements:
1.

the object of competition policy is narrower, generally
restricted to allocative efficiency. Regulation typically
incorporates a wider range of goals, including broader
concerns such as universal access to services, regional
integration, and environmental protection;5

2.

the method employed by antitrust authorities features
the use of market mechanisms, while traditional regulation seeks to replace them;6

3.

antitrust authorities take action a posteriori, except
when controlling acts of concentration,' while traditional regulators establish a priori rules for compliance by
the parties concerned;8

4.

antitrust authorities give preference to structural remedies designed to re-establish the functioning of market
mechanisms. Because the latter tend to be replaced by
regulation, regulatory authorities prefer to adopt behavioral remedies.'

4. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY (1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter OECD
REPORT].
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. In jurisdictions with more experience, control of acts of concentration is
typically a priori.
8. OECD REPORT, supra note 4.
9. Id.
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REGULATION VERSUS COMPETITION POLICY

DIMENSIONS

COMPETITION
POLICY

TRADITIONAL
REGULATION

OBJECTVES

More restrictive:
allocation efficiency

METHOD

Use of market
mechanisms

TIMING

A posterioriexcept for Apriori
concentration

TYPES
OPECT

OF RECOMMEMNDATION

Structural measures

Broader universal access to
services, regional integration,
environmental protection, etc.
Replacement of market
mechanisms

Behavioral measures

Source: OECD (1998), adapted.

Hence competition policy is of a more general nature than
regulation. The latter assumes a certain market structure, usually a natural monopoly which itself justifies regulation. Competition policy seeks to intervene in the market and under
certain circumstances may take preventive action against
anticompetitive configurations, thus avoiding the need for
regulation.
B. Blurring of The Boundaries in The New Millennium
On the threshold of a new millennium, the differences
between competition and regulation are diminishing, the area
of intersection is growing and the defining the boundaries
between the two areas has become increasingly difficult. Chart
2 clarifies this issue by dividing the markets for the sake of
simplicity into those with perfect competition, competitive,
non-competitive, and natural monopolies. Perfect competition
is an abstraction introduced for theoretical purposes, since it
rarely occurs in practice. At the other extreme, many markets
are sufficiently competitive to make action by the authority
unnecessary.
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AND

Various Market Structures
Perfect Competition

I Competitive

Noncompetitive

NaturalMonopoly

Competition Policy

Regultion

_

Competition agencies focus on non-competitive markets in
which there is an oppoitunity for unfair practices due to market dominance. However, many problems arise in these markets as a result of inadequate regulation. The introduction of
rules designed to foster competition may eliminate or at least
mitigate market failures. For example, appropriate regulation
of healthcare plans could diminish the number of problems in
this area. Thus competition policy cannot dispense with regulatory authorities in these markets.
Regulation focuses on natural monopolies. Under natural
monopoly conditions, production costs constantly decrease as
business expands, thus making production by a sole company
the most efficient (i.e., low-cost) form of production." Hence
the need for a regulatory agency to establish specific industry
rules designed to prevent a natural monopolist from abusing
its dominant position.
Such activity is closely related to that of a competition
authority because regulation is best when it mimics the market. Thus, in this instance, the two types of authority may
overlap in scope. In practice, moreover, a regulated segment
comprises several sub-segments that may not necessarily be
natural monopolies and therefore may not need specific regulation.

In addition, the boundaries between natural monopolies
and competitive markets are dynamic. Because cost, technolo-

10. The technical definition of a natural monopoly is a segment in which the
cost function is sub-additive for the relevant production intervals.
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gy, and demand vary significantly over time, natural monopolies are temporary. Hence a segment that initially requires
regulation may at a later stage require only market rules. The
boundaries shown in Chart 2 are therefore flexible. This situation has become increasingly frequent as a result of the accelerating pace of innovation in certain industries such as telecommunications and transportation.
Thus, no matter what type of institutional configuration is
chosen for a country or industry, it should be flexible enough to
ensure that bureaucratic inertia does not hinder development
at a time when markets are highly dynamic and technological
innovation is rapid.
In the course of the 20th century, competition policy has
tended to become preventive rather than merely repressive or
characterized by exclusively ex post facto action. This development began with early antitrust movements in the United
States to control concentration in the initial decades of the
20th century, becoming more structured in the mid-1970s. A
similar approach has been implemented in the European Union since the late 1980s. In both jurisdictions, competition
advocacy has gained considerable importance.
In many of the developing countries, the 1990s have seen
the introduction of legislation to strengthen competition policy,
highlighting new dimensions of public policy in this sphere.
Because these countries often have an overwhelmingly interventionist tradition, there is a clear need to promote competition in environments where market values and institutions
are fragile. Latecomers to competition policy have therefore
emphasized its convergence with regulation, in contrast with
the trend observed in mature jurisdictions.
It is of course a most complex task to transform institutions in order to allow for such changes, especially in more
mature jurisdictions where each type of agency has a clearly
limited sphere of action and remodeling may encounter formidable bureaucratic resistance. For this reason, latecomers may
actually enjoy an advantage. The next section discusses some
of the possibilities open to policy makers.
C. Alternative Institutional Configurations
The issues discussed in the preceding section indicate why
institutional configurations vary in time and space. Institution-
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al frameworks vary considerably from one country to another
and even within the same country, according to the different
segments involved and the stage of development of a particular
jurisdiction.
Despite the influence of such structural factors, it is important to discuss the alternatives for an efficient division of
functions between the two types of agency. There are at least
five options for the design of any legal system in terms of the
relationship between competition policy and regulation, as
shown in Charts 3.1 through 3.5.11
For a better understanding of the divisions established, it
is useful to distinguish three functions:
1.

Technical Regulation (TR): the establishment of rules,
standards and goals to be adopted by the private agents
of a regulated industry;

2.

Economic Regulation (ER): the establishment of conditions for pricing, rates and quantities to be observed by
private agents when supplying regulated goods and/or
services; and

3.

Competition Law (CL): legislation governing free competition.

The five alternatives shown in Charts 3.1 through 3.5
correspond to different distributions of the three functions
described above:
1.

Antitrust exemption: the regulatory authority (RA) applies competition law; specific legislation always prevails
over antitrust law. In this case, the regulatory agency
carries out the three tasks described above, with emphasis on regulatory aspects, leaving no scope for action on
the part of the competition authority (CA). It is even
possible to conceive of situations in which competition
policy legislation does not apply.

11. The alternatives developed in this section are adapted from OECD REPORT, supra note 4.
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POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS: MODEL
1 (ANTITRUST EXEMPTION)

X

X

X

a

2.

Concurrent jurisdictions: the competition and regulatory
authorities both have jurisdiction to apply antitrust
sanctions. Although less common, one could also imagine
shared responsibilities in the area of economic regulation.

CHART 3.2: POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS: MODEL
2 (CONCURRENT JURISDICTION)

X
3.

Complementary Jurisdictions: there is no overlapping of
the two authorities' functions. The division of tasks is
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clear and determines that the regulatory agency deals
exclusively with economic and technical tasks, while the
competition authority enforces antitrust law.
CHART 3.3:

4.

POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS: MODEL
3 (COMPLEMENTARY JURISDICTION)

Antitrust Regulation: the competition authority applies
both antitrust law and economic and technical regulations. This case is symmetrical to Chart 1, in that emphasis is typically placed on antitrust legislation and
regulation is limited to the necessary minimum.

CHART 3.4:

POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS: MODEL
4 (ANTITRUST REGULATION)

~x

xX
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Deregulation: the antitrust authority has sole jurisdiction, eliminating economic and technical regulation.

CHART 3.5:

POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS: MODEL
5 (DEREGULATION)

000
kp*

The possibilities outlined in Charts 3.1 through 3.5 can be
classified according to the importance attributed to market
mechanisms, as suggested by Chart 4. Emphasis on competition policy rather than regulation increases as one moves from
left to right.
CHART 4:

CONTINUUM OF INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

Antitrust Competing
Complementary
Exemption Jurisdictions Jurisdictions

Regulation

Antitrust
Regulation

Competition

Policy

As noted earlier, because of the diversity of modern economies, all five situations and variants of them may be found in
a single country, in accordance with the institutional history
and specificities of each industry.
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Certain examples seem representative of each of the configurations described above. In Bolivia, the rules governing
competition must be enforced by regulatory agencies. 2 In the
United States and Canada, various industries are subject concurrently to two or more agencies. 3 In Australia, regulatory
powers are given to the antitrust authority. 4 New Zealand
adopted what is known as "light-handed regulation," in which
the antitrust authority monitors regulated sectors using a
minimum of regulatory rules, 5 in a situation similar to Model
5. As will be shown in the third part of this Article, the system
adopted in the Brazilian telecommunications industry closely
resembles that of complementary jurisdictions.
The possibilities described above seem compatible with the
range of alternatives suggested by the World Bank in a study
that highlights the alternative of making the competition authority function as an administrative court for appeals against
decisions handed down by regulatory agencies. 6 This would be
compatible with one or more variants of the configurations
discussed. In a system of complementary jurisdictions, for
example, one could imagine that only in cases involving antitrust issues would the regulatory agencies be transformed into
fact-finding bodies charged with raising evidence and issuing a
ruling, which in turn could be appealed to an administrative
court subordinated to the competition authority.
D. Criteriafor Choosing an Optimal InstitutionalDesign
The choice of an optimal institutional configuration is not
a straightforward one. Nor would it be reasonable to aver that
there is a single model to be adopted. The different configurations present advantages and disadvantages depending on
specific conditions. Chart 5 suggests a selection procedure that
takes the following five factors into consideration:

12. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND

COMPETITION POLICY, 290 U.N. Sales No. E.97.11.D.10 (1997).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. WORLD BANK, REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS FOR UTILITIES & COMPETITION:
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT 24-28

(1998).
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1.

Institutional flexibility: As mentioned above, the fast
pace of technological change can transform a natural
monopoly into a competitive market, thus demanding
regulatory changes. Likewise, the appearance of new
production processes and products may alter supply and
demand elasticities. Ideally, regulators should be flexible
enough to deal with such structural changes.

2.

Efficiency and timeliness: Decisions must be made swiftly and firmly; lengthy bureaucratic processes increase
uncertainty and diminish the expected return on investments. A correct assessment of the best way to distribute
powers between the competition authority and regulators depends on: (i) whether there are economies of scale
and specialization in regulatory activities as applied to
specific industries and as between competition policy
and regulation; and, (ii) the comparative bureaucratic
transaction costs of relatively autonomous units. As
discussed below, these two items combined will determine the institutional design adopted from a strictly
operational standpoint.

3.

Bureaucratic transaction costs: Analogous to
Williamson's classic notion of transaction costs in the
theory of the firm," it is useful to define bureaucratic
transaction costs as those relating to the drawing up of
agreements among public bodies. The level of bureaucratic transaction costs varies according to the complexity of inter-institutional operating routines.

4.

Minimizing the risk of conflicting jurisdictions: When
more than one institution has the power to rule on a certain matter, or when two or more institutions have similar powers, there is a risk of conflicting jurisdictions.
This tends to cause delay, uncertainty, and consequently
legal insecurity.

5.

Minimizing the risk of capture: As discussed by
Oliveira,"8 and according to the original work of

17. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONoMIcs 71 (1987).
18. Gesner Oliveira, Defesa da Concorrgncia em Paises em Desenvolvimento:
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Stigler,19 regulatory experience in mature countries
shows that regulatory agencies are highly likely to be
"captured" by the segments that should be subject to
regulation. Aside from the ethical problems involved, it
is relatively easy for certain industries to "capture the
regulators." This is due to the asymmetry of information to the detriment of the public sector, and to professional identification between the specialists who are
temporarily performing adjudication functions and the
segments subject to the specific administrative jurisdiction in question. The extent to which recruitment and
the future careers of regulatory authorities are confined
to the regulated industry constitutes a relevant variable
in determining the probability of capture.
It is no easy task to appraise the different alternatives
according to reasonable public policy criteria. Chart 5 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the models discussed in
3.1 according to the criteria listed above. Model 5 (deregulation) is excluded, since the elimination of regulation means
there is no need to decide which authority does what. A plus
sign (+) is used to indicate that a model has advantages in regard to a particular criterion; a minus sign (-) indicates a possible limitation or disadvantage.
CHART 5:

Criteria

Economies of

istitutional
Flexibility

Scale

Antitrust
Exemption

-

+

Concurrent
Jurisdictions

+

-

+

-

+

-

Model

AN

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATION

Specialization

Bureaucratic
Transaction
Cost

Risk
of
Capture

OPTIMAL

Potential
Jurisdictional
Conflict

Total

+

0

M,
+

M,

+

-2

M3
Complementary

+

+

+

2

+

2

Jurisdictions
M4
Antitrust

Regulation

+

__

Aspectos da Experigncia do Brasil e do Mercosul, IDEIAS & DEBATES, at 48 (1998).
19. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. 3,

3-21 (1971).
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Model 1-antitrust exemption-lacks flexibility since there
is no incentive for the regulatory authority to eliminate market
controls in the event of structural changes. On the other hand,
given the concentration of activities in one institution, it can be
assumed that there are scale economies and no economies of
specialization. However, the risk of capture is high since this
design typically favors regulators that are close to the industry
they are supposed to be overseeing. Lastly, this model features
the advantage of avoiding jurisdictional conflict.
Model 2-concurrent jurisdictions-features greater institutional flexibility insofar as it includes an authority whose
purpose is to promote competition and which should therefore
pose no bureaucratic resistance to the elimination of industry
regulation. However, economies of scale are lost by introducing
a new bureaucratic structure, while overlapping of tasks tends
to eliminate economies of specialization. On the other hand,
the risk of capture is reduced by introducing another agency to
take charge of the more general aspects of competition policy
(albeit at the cost of a certain risk of jurisdictional conflict).
Model 3-complementary jurisdictions-is similar to that
of concurrent jurisdictions except that the regulators specialize
in economic and technical regulation, while the competition
authority specializes in enforcing antitrust law. As in Model 2,
this eliminates possible gains in terms of economies of scale,
but allows for economies of specialization. Again there is less
risk of capture, but this model has the advantage of offering
less potential for conflict between jurisdictions because the
roles of the agencies do not overlap.
Model 4-antitrust regulation-achieves economies of scale
at the cost of economies of specialization. Bureaucratic transaction costs are lower because there is only one agency. As in
Model 1, and theoretically in Model 3, there is no risk of jurisdictional conflict. Because there is one agency, the risk of capture will presumably be greater, but this is mitigated by the
fact that the model proposes a general regulator rather than
industry-specific regulators.
Chart 5 does not provide an immediate answer for the
optimal configuration. Each of the six criteria must be weighed
for its importance in each specific case before drawing a conclusion. Chart 5 does not lead to the conclusion that Models 3
and 4 are necessarily optimal, but provides elements for judgment by the legislator.
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For example, if minimizing the risk of capture were held to
be a fundamental variable, it would be advisable to opt for a
multi-agency model. On the other hand, Model 4 offers advantages in cases where flexibility and enabling regulation to keep
pace with market change are given priority.
A subset of the criteria set out in Chart 5 can be helpful in
determining the division of functions between competition and
regulatory agencies. Here the following two variables are singled out:
1)

the presence of economies of scale in antitrust and regulation activities, or considerable economies of specialization between the two;

2)

the costs of bureaucratic transactions between relatively
autonomous specialized units.

Chart 6 shows the possibilities to be considered. If transaction costs and economies of specialization are low, Models 1
and 4 should have preference, as indicated in cell (c) of Chart
6. Indeed, a single agency would avoid the cost of coordinating
actions between competition and regulatory authorities, while
losing little in terms of economies of specialization.
On the other hand, if transaction costs are low but economies of specialization are significant, Models 2 and 3 would
seem advantageous. It would presumably be easy to coordinate
actions among different government bodies and possible losses
in terms of economies of specialization would be small.
CHART 6:

POSSIBILITIES OF CHOICE, ECONOMIES OF
SPECIALIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC TRANSACTION
COSTS

TRANSACTION COSTS
HIGH

LOW

ECONOMIES OF
SPECIALIZATION

a)

b)
M2 - Concurrent Jurisdictions

HIGH

n - Compementary Jurisictio

c)
LOW

M - Antitrust exemption
r4 - Antitrust regulation

d)
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Bureaucratic transaction costs have in fact been high.
Coordination among different agencies is far from straightforward, but this seems to be the relevant policy variable, insofar
as it is the one that can be altered by deliberate public effort
in minimizing transaction costs. Note that the costs of coordination among public agencies may be seen as a variable that
can be influenced by policy.
Meanwhile, economies of specialization seem to be high.
Although regulation and competition have converged, as argued earlier, they entail a number of complex and detailed
tasks which require a great deal of specialization. It does not
seem advisable to merge specialized bureaucracies.
Since it seems easier to reduce bureaucratic transaction
costs than economies of specialization, improving coordination
among competition and regulatory authorities should be seen
as a policy priority if the goal is to obtain a satisfactory institutional configuration such as the one represented by Model 3.
Institutions are not created in a void. Their foundations,
which are especially important, are the material and human
resources available for the implementation of any particular
configuration. If, for example, the banking industry has traditionally been regulated by a central bank that is highly active
in the regulatory field, there will probably be a tendency to
extend its activity to the area of competition policy, and in this
case it will be more difficult to implement a system of complementary or even concurrent jurisdictions. Such situations may
involve high transaction costs because of possible jurisdictional
conflicts or the need to develop industry-specific expertise
within a relatively short length of time. This would justify a
special strategy including the anticipation of a longer period
for institutional change, for example.
As amply demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the
choice of which institutional model to be adopted in any given
country or for any given economic sector involves a number of
variables and should always take concrete historical experience
into account. The next section illustrates how the model of
complementary jurisdictions has been implemented in Brazil,
with emphasis on the successful effort to minimize the cost of
coordination between the competition authority (CADE) and
the new regulatory agency for the telecommunications industry
(ANATEL).
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BASED
ON THE COMPLEMENTARY JURISDICTIONS MODEL IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: ASPECTS OF THE RECENT

BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
The institutional framework for regulation of the telecommunications industry in Brazil has been entirely reformulated,
owing to the privatization of the state-owned operators and the
creation of a competitive environment for this industry. The
legal framework for this institutional restructuring was furnished by the 1997 General Telecommunications Act.2 ° The
Act introduced an entirely new set of general rules for the
provision of telecommunications services.
From an institutional perspective, the most significant
change introduced by the Act was the creation of a new regulatory agency for the telecommunications industry. Known as
ANATEL, the telecommunications regulator is charged under
article 19, clause I with the enforcement of national telecommunications policy and is given the jurisdiction and resources
necessary for broad regulation of the industry.2 '
It is important to stress that when establishing a new
legal framework for the telecommunications industry, the Act
expressly states that the rules of competition policy are to be
applied to telecommunications operators. Some questions have
been raised on this matter. On the one hand, the Act empowers ANATEL to enforce competition policy. 2 On the other
hand, the Act expressly preserves the competition authority's
general jurisdiction over the telecommunications industry.'
Enforcing competition policy on the telecommunications industry required coordination between CADE and ANATEL, resulting in an approximation to Model 3 with elements of Model 2,
as described in the first part of this Article.
A.

Relationship Between The General TelecommunicationsAct
and Competition Policy

The legislator's goal of establishing a competitive environment for the telecommunications industry is an essential fea-

20.
21.
22.
23.

General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1.
Id. art. 19(I).
Id. art. 19(XIX).
Id.
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tire of the entire Act. Article 2 states that it behooves the
public authorities "to take steps to promote competition and
diversification of services," and "to create investment opportunities, and to foster technological and industrialdevelopment in
a competitive environment."

Article 7 reflects the legislator's concern with competition
policy even more obviously. This Article states that "the general rules governing the protection of the economic order shall
apply to the telecommunications industry whenever they do not
conflict with the provisions of this Act. "
The Act is even more specific in Article 19, clause XIX,
where it states that ANATEL "shallhave the legal authority to
control, prevent and curb any breach of the economic order in
the telecommunications industry, without prejudice to the powers vested in Conselho Administrativo de Defesa da
Econ6mica-CADE.27
This provision brings the above-mentioned issue into evidence. ANATEL is empowered to enforce competition law without prejudice to the jurisdiction of CADE. Although this leaves
a "gray area" in which jurisdictions may overlap, whatever
institutional configuration is to be adopted, as far as competition policy for the telecommunications industry is concerned, it
will require cooperation between the two authorities-and will
therefore tend to constitute a model of complementary jurisdictions.
Under the terms of the Act, the relationship between
CADE and ANATEL in enforcing competition policy is complex,
insofar as it varies according to the legal regime under which a
particular telecommunications service is provided (public law
or private law), and according to whether oversight focuses on
structures or behavior. The following subsections discuss how
the Act deals with the articulation between CADE and
ANATEL in each of these situations.

24. Id. art. 2(111) (emphasis added).
25. Id. art. 2(V) (emphasis added).
26. Id. art. 7. "Protection of the economic order" evidently includes competition
policy, as established by Federal Law 8884. Decreto No. 8884, de 11 de junho de
1994, LEX de 6.01.1994 [hereinafter Federal Law]. Indeed, Article 1 of Federal
Law 8884 states that "this law regulates the prevention and repression of violations of the economic order." Id. art. 1.
27. General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, art. 19(XIX) (emphasis
added).
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Legal Regimes for The Provision of Telecommunications
Services

The General Telecommunications Act states that telecommunications services in Brazil may be provided under two
legal regimes: public law and private law.28 Providers of public
law services are deemed to be operating in the public interest
and are therefore obliged to guarantee universal access and
continuity, i.e., uninterrupted service.
Providers of public law services must be licensed by
ANATEL," although in exceptional circumstances a permit
may be granted.3 These services are stringently controlled by
ANATEL, which has the authority to determine rate structures
among other items.
Private law services are subordinated to the principles of
economic activity, 2 whose key corollary is free enterprise. Providers of private law services are not bound to guarantee universal access and continuity. In this case, the rule is to intervene as little as possible in order to guarantee freedom of action for operators."3
Private law providers must obtain authorization from
ANATEL in order to operate. In principle there is no limit to
the number of authorizations, and as many companies as are
technically eligible can provide such services. However, the
regulatory agency may restrict the number of authorizations
for certain reasons such as technical limitations or what is

28. Id. art. 63.
29. See id. art. 79.
30. See id. art. 83.
31. See id. art. 118. The terms "license" (concessdo) and "permit" (permisso)
are concepts taken from administrative law and used by the state to grant private
firms the right to provide a public service.
32. See id. art. 126. The term "economic activity," as used in Article 126 of
the Act, designates economic activity sensu stricto. This item deserves some explanation. Economic activity sensu lato can be divided into two categories: economic
activity sensu stricto and public service. The former comprises the economic sphere
allotted to private agents and in which the state may operate only in the exceptional cases set forth in Article 173 of the Federal Constitution. "Public service"
comprises the economic sphere allotted to the state and in which private enterprise is allowed to operate only under license from the state, or by permission or
authorization, as per Article 175 of the Federal Constitution. For a detailed explanation of the difference between economic activity sensu lato, economic activity
sensu stricto and public service, see EROS R. GRAU, A ORDEM ECONOMICA NA
CONSTITUIQAO DE 1998 131-32 (1997).

33. See General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, art. 128(I).
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termed "relevant collective interest."
The state is empowered under the Act to decide which
services are to be provided under public or private law. The
same service can be provided simultaneously by private law
and public law carriers.34
C. Control of Market Structures: The General Rule
Market structure control can be defined as a form of a
priori competition policy in which government authorities analyze acts of business concentration that may have an impact on
the market, banning those deemed to represent a potential
threat to competition. Hence, its main purpose is to prevent
concentration and abuse of market power.
Federal Law 8884 establishes that in certain circumstances (if the companies involved attain a certain level of business
volume or a certain share of the material markets in which
they operate), a corporate merger or acquisition must be authorized by CADE no later than two weeks after it takes effect.35
The General Telecommunications Act provides specifically
for market structure control mechanisms in Article 7, where
reference is made to the general rules governing protection of
the economic order. These two clauses establish that: (i) acts of
concentration involving telecommunications service providers
shall be submitted to structure controls as stipulated in competition law;" and (ii) acts of concentration shall be presented to
ANATEL, which shall refer them to CADE for judgment.
Article 71 of the General Telecommunications Act grants
ANATEL broad preventive powers in connection with the
granting and transfer of licenses, permits, and authorizations.

34. See id. art. 18(I). This situation may cause intricate problems for competition policy enforcement, because of structural inequalities between public law and
private law providers. The former are submitted to severe state control and are
bound by obligations of universal access and continuity. The latter provide exactly
the same services free of state intervention and without the obligations cited. This
asymmetry must be taken into account by CADE and ANATEL when enforcing
competition policy.
35. Federal Law, supra note 26, art. 54, § 3. In more mature jurisdictions,
mergers and acquisitions are normally controlled a priori. In Brazil, however, this
control usually takes place after the event. For a brief discussion of recent trends
in Brazilian merger control, see Gesner Oliveira, Recent Trends in Brazilian Merger Control, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., April/May 1999, at 24.
36. General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, art. 7, §1.
37. Id. § 2.
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ANATEL may impose limitations, restrictions, or conditions
when granting these or authorizing their transfer, in order to
assure effective competition among the telecommunications
operators."8
Thus, as far as market structure control is concerned, the
general rule is that ANATEL acts as a fact-finding agency
while CADE adjudicates. If the procedures set forth in Federal
Law 8884 are enforced, ANATEL may also act as a consultative body and issue an opinion on any case. Using the terminology defined in the first part of this Article, this situation
constitutes a model of complementary jurisdictions (Model 3)
based on a division of functions between the competition authority and the industry regulator.
D. Control of Market Structures for Public Law Service
Providers
Acts of concentration involving public law telecommunications service providers are subjected to stringent control of
market structures. First, the Act establishes that all spin-offs,
mergers, transformations, amalgamations, capital reductions,
or transfers of ownership shall be submitted to ANATEL for
prior approval. 9 ANATEL bases its decision on: (i) whether
the change in question will hinder competition; and (ii) whether it will endanger performance of the licensing contract signed
by the incumbent."
This provision does not preclude application of Article 7 of
the Act, which states that acts of concentration in the telecommunications industry must be submitted to CADE. Thus, any
act of concentration that fits the terms set forth in Federal
Law 8884, Article 54, paragraph 3 must be examined by
CADE.4 '
It is important to point out that ANATEL analyzes all acts
of concentration involving public law operators, regardless of
their business volume or market share, while CADE examines
only those falling within the terms of Federal Law 8884, Arti-

38. See id. art. 71.
39. Id. art. 97. The introduction of a priori structure control is a significant
innovation in the Brazilian legal system.
40. Id. art. 97, pardgrafo dnico.
41. Federal Law, supra note 26, art. 54, para. 3.
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cle 54, paragraph 3.42 Thus, some transactions may be submitted for prior analysis by ANATEL, but not necessarily sent on
to CADE. This subset of operations would presumably pose
regulatory issues but not potential competition concerns.
Naturally, this division of functions between the two authorities entails a number of routines which have to be developed in order to minimize bureaucratic transaction costs. This
is the purpose of a cooperation program signed by CADE and
ANATEL.
E.

Control of Market Structures for Private Law Service
Providers

CADE is basically responsible for market structure control
for private law telecommunications operators, in accordance
with Federal Law 8884. 4 ' This makes perfect sense since the
services involved are governed by the principles applying to
economic activity sensu stricto. The only difference in relation
to the general rules established in Federal Law 8884 is that
under the Act, ANATEL is responsible for preparing an opinion on the case instead of Secretariade Direito Econ6mico (the
Economic Law Office), which normally performs that task.4 4
F.

Control of Market Structures for Private Law Service
Providers With a Limited Number ofAuthorizations

As previously mentioned, in principle there are no limits to
the number of authorizations granted to private law service
providers. However, in exceptional cases (i.e., when "material
collective interest" or "technical limitations" are involved), the
number of authorizations may be limited.
In this case, transfer of an authorization must abide by
the same rules that apply to the transfer of a license to provide
public law services as per Article 98 of the Act. 4' Hence,
ANATEL has prior control over such a transfer.
However, it is important to note that this prior control
requirement applies only to the transfer of authorizations: the
Act does not require prior control of private law operators

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See supra note 26, art. 7.
Id. art. 40.
General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, art. 98.
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when the number of authorizations is limited.46 Thus, acts of
concentration involving private law operators are controlled
only ex post facto by CADE, along the lines described earlier.
Chart 7 summarizes the above discussion.
CHART 7:

OF

SUMMARY

MARKET

STRUCTURE

CONTROL

PROVISIONS IN THE GENERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

Regime

Public

Private with limited
authorizations

Private with
unlimited
authorizations

X

X

X

Body

CADE
ANATEL

Legend:
Types of acts that require authorization by public authorities:
X = acts defined in competition law (Article 54)
XX = transfers of licenses, permits and authorizations
XXX = mergers and acquisitions, changes in corporate form, capital
reductions, and transfers of licenses, permits and authorizations
W= prior authorization required (a priori control)

It is important to note that all cases examined by CADE
will have been investigated and submitted to it by ANATEL.
ANATEL therefore performs a major role as fact-finding body
even in cases involving private law operators, which only require approval by CADE.
G.

Control of Conduct in The Telecommunications Industry

The General Telecommunications Act is vague as to the
jurisdictional boundaries for enforcement of the rules designed
to avert anticompetitive behavior on the part of economic
agents in the telecommunications industry. Again the relevant
provision is Article 19, clause XIX, which empowers ANATEL

46. Id. art. 97.
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to punish violations without prejudice to the powers vested in
CADE.
However, Article 70 of the Act states that conduct prejudicial to competition "shall be repressed," listing among others:
(i) the practice of subsidies aimed at artificially reducing prices; (ii) the use of information obtained from competitors by
virtue of inter-company service agreements; and (iii) the omission of technical and commercial information relevant to the
rendering of services by third parties."
A logical interpretation of this Article would be that it
merely extends the list of violations included for the purpose of
exemplification in Article 21 of Federal Law 8884 by inserting
anticompetitive practices specific to the telecommunications
industry. Indeed, extending the list of violations confirms the
jurisdiction of CADE to judge these "new" violations. However,
as in the case of merger control, the role of ANATEL is crucial,
since it replaces the Economic Law Office in the investigation
of cases involving conduct.
In drafting the General Telecommunications Act the legislature clearly opted for a model based on complementary jurisdictions. This realization demands more clearly delimited
boundaries for each agency's role in preventing and punishing
violations of the economic order. Hence, the importance of
coordination between CADE and ANATEL.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Competition policy and regulation have increasingly converged in recent years, and it is difficult to draw clear boundaries between the two areas. Thus any effort to optimize the
activities of competition authorities and regulators requires
more effective coordination between them.
From this perspective there are various possible institutional configurations, ranging from antitrust exemption to
deregulation via models that feature concurrent jurisdictions,
complementary jurisdictions, and antitrust regulation.
Various factors must be taken into consideration when
choosing an optimal institutional model, such as: institutional
flexibility, economies of scale and specialization between com-

47. General Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, art. 19(XIX).
48. Id. art. 70.
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petition policy and regulation, bureaucratic transaction costs,
the risk of capture, and potential jurisdictional conflict. However, it must be stressed that the choice should always take account of concrete historical experience in each jurisdiction and
industry.
In the specific case of the Brazilian telecommunications
industry, this Article has suggested that the model of complementary jurisdictions applies. If current efforts to coordinate
activities between ANATEL (regulatory agency) and CADE
(competition authority) succeed, this model may prove to be the
optimal institutional configuration.
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